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STATE V. FRY: RECONSIDERING DEATHQUALIFICATION IN NEW MEXICO CAPITAL TRIALS
KYLE WACKENHEIM*
"Preoccupationwith [death qualification]createsan atmosphere in which jurors
are likely to assume that their primary task is to determine the penalty for a
presumptively guilty defendant. ",
INTRODUCTION
Death-qualification, the process by which potential jurors are impaneled in a
capital trial, deprives the defendant of a fair and impartial trial. Sociological
evidence indicates that death qualifying a jury results in a prosecution friendly,
conviction-prone jury. Potential jurors who oppose the death penalty are excluded,
while their prosecution friendly peers remain. Jurors are asked if they are able to
sentence the defendant to death even before opening statements; even as the
defendant sits as an innocent party.
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in State v. Fry,2 had the opportunity to revisit
death-qualification but rejected the defendant's argument that the exclusion of
certain prospective jurors violated his constitutional right to an impartial jury.3
This case note encourages the New Mexico Supreme Court to reexamine the
state's death-qualification process for juries in capital cases. In light of recent
studies by the Capital Jury Project that demonstrate the failures of death-qualified
capital juries, a reconsideration of the existing unitary jury system in New Mexico
capital cases is necessary. Without a change, accused defendants who are presumed
innocent will continue to be deprived of their constitutional right to a fair and
impartial jury.
To begin, this note will briefly discuss Furmanv. Georgia4 and the United States
Supreme Court's concerns about the arbitrary implementation of the death penalty.
Next, it will survey the Supreme Court cases that addressed concerns about the
death-qualification of juries, including the then-existing sociological studies that
were before the Court. The note will then trace New Mexico jurisprudence on death
qualification of capital juries, followed by an examination of the New Mexico
Supreme Court's decision in Fry. Then, it will describe the work and findings of the
Capital Jury Project. Finally, this note proposes a tangible and workable solution
to this serious deficiency in New Mexico's capital jury selection procedure. The
purpose of this article is not to advocate for the abolition of the death penalty,5 but
rather to reexamine a practice that, by its nature, may deprive an accused's
fundamental right to a fair jury in the most perilous of cases.

* J.D. Candidate, 2009. I would like to thank Professor Barbara Bergman for her guidance and wisdom.
I am also indebted to Jeff Buckels, Jared De Jong, Nat Chakeres, and Juan Marquez. Finally, I would like to thank
Paula for her support and patience throughout this process.
1. Justice John Paul Stevens, Address to the American Bar Association Thurgood Marshall Awards Dinner,

Hyatt Regency Hotel, Chicago, Illinois (Aug. 6, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-06-05.html).
2. 2006-NMSC-001,126 P.3d 516.
3. Id. 1 15, 126 P.3d at 524.
4. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See Part I infra.
5. For a balanced discussion on both sides of the capital punishment debate, see DEBATING THE DEATH
PENALTY: SHouLD AMERICA HAVE CAPITAL PuNISHMENT? (Hugo Bedau & Paul Cassell eds., 2004).

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 38

I. OVERVIEW OF DEATH-QUALIFICATION
Modem Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence derives from Furman v.
Georgia.6 In that case, the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, declared the death
penalty as applied in Georgia and Texas unconstitutional. An understanding of the
holding in Furman and the subsequent re-establishment of the death penalty is
important in understanding present day American death penalty jurisprudence.
Furmanconsolidated the cases of three defendants who had been sentenced to
death.7 One defendant was found guilty of murder while the two other defendants
were convicted of rape. 8 Without a majority opinion, five members of the court held
the Georgia and Texas statutes unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. 9 The
court issued a per curiam opinion that stated, "the imposition and carrying out of the
death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 1 °
At the heart of the Court's decision in Furman was a concern over the arbitrary
implementation of capital punishment. Justice Douglas identified the problem:
"[N]o standards govern the selection of the penalty. People live or die, dependent
on the whim of one man or of 12. ' 'n The Georgia statute failed to provide the judge
or jury with standards to guide discretion in deciding whether or not to impose the
death penalty. 12 Indeed, for Justice Stewart, the death sentences at issue were "cruel13
and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual."'
While Justices Marshall and Brennan held the death penalty unconstitutional under
the Eighth Amendment,14 the plurality opinion did not declare capital punishment
per se unconstitutional.15 This opening allowed states to redraft their statutes to
confront the Court's concerns with the arbitrary nature of capital punishment.
And, indeed, thirty-five states passed amended capital punishment statutes in
response to Furman. 6 The Supreme Court then ruled on the constitutionality of the
modified statutes in a series of three cases: Gregg v. Georgia,Profittv. Florida,and
Jurekv. Texas.17 Georgia's amended statute, which provided six categories of crime

6. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
7. Id. at 239.
8. Id.
9. See generally id. (Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall comprised the majority).
10. 408 U.S. at 239. The Eighth Amendment provides, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
11. 408 U.S. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
12. See 408 U.S. at 308-309 n.8 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that the Georgia statute gave juries the
choice of at least one year imprisonment, life imprisonment, or death).
13. 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice White also noted, "[Tlhe death penalty is exacted with
great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the
few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not." Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The punishment of death is therefore 'cruel and unusual,' and the
States may no longer inflict it...."); id. at 370 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe death penalty violates the Eighth
Amendment.").
15. Id. at 239-40 (per curiam).
16. For a complete list, see Gregg v. Georgia,428 U.S. 153, 179 n.23 (1976).
17. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262 (1976).
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for death, 8 was at issue in the first of the three.' 9 In a bifurcated proceeding, the
trial judge or jury first determined the defendant's guilt or innocence. 2' If a finding
of guilt was returned, the trier of fact then heard "additional evidence in the
extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment" to determine the
defendant's sentence.21 Further, the trier of fact could only sentence the defendant
to death if one of the ten (10) enumerated aggravating factors were found beyond
a reasonable doubt. 22 The trial judge was also required to complete a six-and-onehalf page questionnaire designed to determine any arbitrariness and disproportionality of the sentence. 23 Additionally, the statute provided the defendant with an
expedited mandatory appeal to the state high court to determine, among other
things, "[w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of
24
passion, prejudice, or [any other] arbitrary factor.
The Supreme Court found that the Georgia statute satisfied the Court's concern
over arbitrary implementation of capital punishment. The Court noted that a
bifurcated capital trial in which a guilt/innocence determination is separate and
distinct from a sentencing decision "is more likely to ensure elimination of
[Furman's] constitutional deficiencies., 26 The Court further noted that jurors
needed guidance regarding the sentencing decision as they are "unlikely to be
27
skilled" in considering the information presented during the punishment phase.
Thus, the Court endorsed the Georgia capital punishment scheme while not
mandating that states follow Georgia's exact procedure.2 8
The Court also declared that both the Florida 29 and Texas30 statutes were
constitutional. In contrast to Georgia, Florida's statute rendered the jury's verdict
as advisory only and the trial judge determined the final sentence after weighing the
statutory aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances. The Court did not find
this difference substantial enough to invalidate the statute.32 Indeed, the court noted
that the Florida system "serves to assure that sentences of death will not be
18. GA. CODEANN. §§ 26-1101 (1972), 26-1311 (1972), 26-1902 (1972), 26-2001 (1972), 26-2201 (1972),

26-3301 (1972). The only notable difference for the court was the removal of a possible death sentence for the
crime of capital perjury. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 163 n.6.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Gregg, 428 U.S. 153.
Id. at 163.
Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2503 (1975)).
Id. at 164-65; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (1975) (list of all ten aggravating factors).
Id. at 167 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(a) (1975)).
Id. at 166-67 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537 (1975)).
Id. at 187 ("We hold that the death penalty is not a form ofpunishment that may never be imposed....

26. Id. at 191-92.
27. Id. at 192.
28. For the majority, Georgia's statute was sufficient:
We do not intend to suggest that only the above-described procedures would be permissible
under Furman or that any sentencing system constructed along these general lines would

inevitably satisfy the concerns of Furman,for each distinct system must be examined on an
individual basis. Rather, we have embarked upon this general exposition to make clear that it
is possible to construct capital-sentencing systems capable of meeting Furman's constitutional
concerns.

Id. at 195.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
Profitt, 428 U.S. at 252.
Id. at 252 ("[lt has never been suggested that jury sentencing is constitutionally required.").
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'wantonly' or 'freakishly' imposed."33 Thus, Florida's approach to capital
punishment was sufficient to overcome Furman.
The Court also ruled the Texas Capital Punishment statute as constitutional in
Jurek.34 In addition to limiting death-eligible crimes, the Texas statute guided the
jury's discretion in the sentencing phase by asking three questions which focused
on the accused's state of mind, his threat to society, and the reasonableness of his
actions.3 5 If the jury found the answer to each question in the affirmative beyond a
reasonable doubt, a sentence of death was imposed, otherwise the defendant was
sentenced to life imprisonment.36 The Court concluded that the Texas statute also
met the concerns in Furmanby limiting and guiding discretion in the penalty phase
of a capital trial.37
Thus, the Court endorsed capital punishment schemes in as much as they
confronted its concern in Furmanabout arbitrary and standardless impositions of
the death penalty. The Court was satisfied that, with a bifurcated proceeding in
which the jury considers aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances, the
death penalty would be reserved for the most deserving of crimes.
II. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON DEATH-QUALIFICATION
In a capital trial, the jury is charged with the most serious of tasks-possibly
deciding on the life or death of a defendant. Because of the seriousness of the jurors'
role, challenges on behalf of capital defendants have centered, in part, on the role of
the capital jury. Through a series of cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court, unitary juries that decide both phases of a capital trial must go through a
specialized voir dire to ensure they are "death-qualified" and able to decide on both
phases of the capital trial. This section explores the requirements as set forth by the
high court in death-qualifying a jury and traces the challenges to this procedure.
A. Witherspoon v. Illinois and the Witherspoon-excludables
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 38 the Court invalidated a statute that allowed the state
to challenge for cause any juror who had "conscientious scruples" against the death
penalty. 39 The petitioner appealed the jury's guilty verdict and sentence of death,

33. Id. at 260 (internal citations omitted).
34. 428 U.S. 262.
35. The three questions were:
(1) Whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would
result; (2) whether there is a probabiity that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and (3) if raised by the evidence,
whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to
the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1976), quoted in Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269.
36. Id. Texas also provided for an expedited appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071(f) (Vernon 1976), cited in Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269.
37. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276.
38. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). While Witherspoon was decided before Furman and its progeny, the holding in
Witherspoon was unaffected by those cases.
39. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 512. The statute at issue read: "In trials for murder it shall be a cause for
challenge of any juror who shall, on being examined, state that he has conscientious scruples against capital

Summer 2008]

DEA TH-QUALIFICA TION OF CAPITAL JURIES

claiming that the prosecution's successful challenges for cause to nearly half of
prospective jurors resulted in an unfair trial.'
Witherspoon argued, among other things, that the Illinois process for jury
selection resulted in a jury that was conviction prone.4" He offered, as means of
introduction to the issue, a law review article that discussed the effect of deathqualification on the jury's evaluation of guilt.42 In that article, Professor Oberer
made the proposition that "a jury qualified on the death penalty is one more apt to
convict.... As support for his theory, he suggested that
The consequence [of death-qualification] is that a jury qualified on the death
penalty will necessarily have been culled of the most humane of its prospective
members .... Jurors hesitant to levy the death penalty would also seem more prone
to resolve the many doubts as to guilt or innocence in the defendant's favor than
would jurors qualified on the 'pound of flesh' approach."
In support of this theory, Witherspoon offered a number of unpublished sociological studies.4 5 In W. Cody Wilson's 1964 study, for example, 187 college
students were given a written survey that sought to test the validity of Professor
Oberer' s proposition.' The students were given a series of simulated capital trials
in which they were to reach a verdict on the fictitious defendant's guilt. 47 The
students' responses to the simulated trials provided a baseline for the individual's
tendency towards guilt.4 In addition, the students were asked for their general
attitudes with respect to capital punishment.49 The students were also asked whether
they agreed or disagreed with a series of statements that would indicate the
individual's tendency for a positive or negative prosecution bias.5 °

punishment, or that he is opposed to the same." Id. (citing ILL. COMP. STAT., c.38, § 743 (1959)). While both the
defendant and state had a prescribed number of peremptory challenges that did not require an articulated reason
for dismissal, challenges for cause were unlimited under the statute. Id.
40. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 512. A total of forty-seven potential members of the jury were excluded for
cause. Of those forty-seven, five stated they were unable to impose the death penalty in any circumstance. Id. at
514.
41. Brief of Petitioner at 11, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) ("[A] jury composed of persons
who have no scruples against capital punishment is partial to the prosecution on the issue of innocence or guilt,
and is therefore more likely to find the defendant guilty than ajury from which scrupled jurors are not excluded.").
42. Id. at 30 (citing Walter E. Oberer, Does Disqualificationof Jurors for Scruples Against Capital
Punishment Constitute Denial of FairTrial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEx. L. REv. 545 (1961)).
43. Oberer, supranote 42, at 545 (emphasis in original).
44. Id. at 549.
45. Brief of Petitioner app. 4, supra note 41.
46. Id. (citing W. Cody Wilson, Belief in Capital Punishment and Jury Performance (unpublished
manuscript, Univ. of Texas)).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. The statements were:
a) The district attorney's interpretation of the facts in a criminal case [is] usually more reliable
than the defense lawyer's. b) If two witnesses gave conflicting testimony in a criminal case, I
would probably believe the witness for the prosecution rather than the witness for the defense.
c) If I were a member of a jury, I could never vote 'not guilty' for a man whose defense was
insanity. d) The plea of 'not guilty by reason of insanity' is a loophole that allows many
criminals to escape punishment.
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Wilson found, based on an analysis of the students' written responses, that deathqualification resulted in the denial of a fair trial.51 Specifically, exclusion of jurors
with conscious scruples against capital punishment resulted in a jury pool more
biased in the favor of guilt, more confident in its decision, more biased in favor of
the prosecution, prejudiced against a defense of insanity, and more likely to impose
a more severe punishment.5 2 Wilson concluded, "Ifthe existence of such systematic
biases in juries as a result of the selection process constitutes denial of fair trial,
then disqualification of jurors for scruples against capital punishment does
constitute denial of fair trial."53
As further support for death-qualification's effect on the guilt/innocence phase
of a trial, Witherspoon offered a study conducted by Faye Goldberg in which twohundred students answered a questionnaire that included sixteen simulated capital
trials.54 The students imposed a verdict and sentence and disclosed whether they had
conscientious scruples against the death penalty. The results of the study indicated
that those who had no scruples against the death penalty convicted in 75 percent of
the simulated cases, while those who had scruples convicted in 69 percent of the
cases.5 6 In sum, those subjects who did not have scruples against capital punishment
were more likely to convict, more likely to convict for a harsher crime, more likely
to impose harsher sentences, and less likely to acquit by reason of insanity.57
Unfortunately for Witherspoon, the Court considered the proffered studies as
"too tentative and fragmentary to establish that jurors not opposed to the death
penalty tend to favor the prosecution in determination of guilt."5 8 The Court
declined to rule that death-qualification resulted in an unrepresentative jury on guilt,
or that it substantially increases the risk of conviction.59 The majority agreed with
an amicus brief that noted the Witherspoon record did not provide the necessary
factual context to make such a determination. 6°
However, the Court did not leave Witherspoon without relief. Instead, it held that
the Illinois statute produced a death-qualification scheme that violated the Sixth and

51.

Id.

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Brief of Petitioner app. 4, supranote 41 (citing Faye J. Goldberg, Attitude Toward CapitalPunishment
and Behavioras a Jurorin SimulatedJury Cases (unpublished manuscript, Morehouse College)).

55. Id.
56. Id. The study also included a glimpse into the racial divide over the death penalty. Seventy-six percent
(76%) of African-American subjects indicated they had scruples against capital punishment as compared to 47
percent (47%) of White subjects. Id. Notably, 42 percent (42%) of those who indicated they had scruples against

capital punishment voted to impose death in at least one of the simulated cases. Goldberg considered this
discrepancy as a contradiction on the part of the subjects. Id. However, there may be another interpretation of this
"inconsistency." That a significant portion ofjurors with scruples against the death penalty voted to impose death
may speak to those jurors' ability to follow the law over their internal disposition.
57. Id.
58. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517 (1968).
59. Id. at 517-18.
60. See Motion for Leave to File BriefAmici Curiae and Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational

Fund, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) ("[W]e
contend that decision of the scrupled-juror issue had best be deferred for decision on fuller records than are now
before the Court...").
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Fourteenth Amendments.6 ' These constitutional violations stemmed from the fact

that the state excluded potential jurors that had any opposition to the death penalty
without determining if that opposition would interfere with returning a verdict of
death.62 Thus, Witherspoon was subjected to a system that "produced a jury
uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die."63
The Witherspoon decision prohibited states from excluding potential jurors who
exhibited "general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or
religious scruples against its infliction."' However, the decision also ensured that
states could exclude jurors who made "unmistakably clear" that they would vote
against a sentence of death without consideration of the evidence or "that their
attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial
decision as to the defendant's guilt."65 These jurors, who can be excluded for cause
under the holding in Witherspoon, are called "Witherspoon-excludables."'
B. Wainwright v. Witt and the Modification of Witherspoon
The Court further clarified the Witherspoon"7 standard in Wainwright v. Witt. 68
Witt was convicted and sentenced to death under Florida law. 69 On appeal from the
Middle District of Florida's denial of habeas corpus, the Eleventh Circuit found that
70
the excusal of one of the jurors for cause violated the Witherspoon standard.
During voir dire, veniremember Colby's responses were unclear as to whether she
would automatically fail to follow the jury instructions based on her general
scruples against capital punishment. 7 The Eleventh Circuit drew on footnote

61.

Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 518. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part: "nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
62. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520.
63. Id.at 521.
64. Id. at 522.
65. Id. at 522n.21.
66. The precise definition of a properly excluded Witherspoon-excludablehas changed overtime. See Part
1.C.2 infra.
67. In 1980, the Court recast the standard for Witherspoon-excludables in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38
(1980): "[A] juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views
would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions
and his oath." Id. at 45. Seemingly, this was a conflict with Witherspoon's standard which required an absolute
opposition to capital punishment for exclusion.
68. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
69. Id.
at 414.
70. Id. at 415 (citing Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1069 (11 th Cir. 1983), modified, 723 F.2d 769 (11th
Cir. 1984)).
71. In relevant part, the exchange during voir dire occurred as follows:
Prosecutor (P): Do you have any religious beliefs or personal beliefs against the death penalty?
Colby (C): I am afraid of being a little personal, but definitely not religious.
P: Now, would that interfere with your sitting as a juror in this case?
C: I am afraid it would.
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twenty-one of the Witherspoon opinion and determined that "Colby's limited
expressions of feelings and thoughts failed to unequivocally state that she would
automatically be unable to apply the death penalty.""
In the majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist began by limiting the scope of
Witherspoon's holding. Witherspoon was decided before Furmanand dealt with a
jury that had unlimited discretion over the defendant's sentence.73 Since Furman
and its progeny, the majority noted, a capital jury no longer had unfettered
discretion in sentencing decisions.74 Therefore, the issue became whether the juror
could truthfully answer the questions provided for in the statutory scheme.
Otherwise, a state might force "a venireman to sit despite the fact that he will be
unable to view the case impartially."7 5
The Court's new standard for removing a venireman for cause in a capital trial
became, "whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the
performance of his duties as ajuror in accordance with his instructions and oath. 76
The bias did not need to be demonstrated with "unmistakable clarity" and, in
making this determination, the trial judge was given deference.7 7 Under this
clarified standard, juror Colby was justly excused for cause, and the Court reversed
the Eleventh Circuit's decision.78
C. Lockhart v. McCree-FederalTreatment of Death-Qualificationand Jury
Pronenessfor Guilt
In 1986, the Supreme Court decided Lockhart v. McCree,79 a case in which the
issue of death-qualification's effect on guilt-prone juries was directly before the
Court.8 ° McCree had been found guilty of capital felony murder under Arkansas
law, but was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. 8 ! During voir dire, eight
prospective jurors were excused for cause because they stated an inability to, under
any circumstances, impose the death penalty.82 McCree challenged the removal of
the "Witherspoon-excludables" under his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right

P: Would it interfere with judging the guilt or innocence of the Defendant in this case?
C: I think so.
Id. at 415-16 (citing Witt, 714 F.2d 1069).
72. Id. at 417 (internal quotations omitted).
73. Id. at 421.
74. See Part Isupra.
75. Witt, 469 U.S. at 422. The majority also cast footnote twenty-one of Witherspoon as dicta. The
Witherspoon holding related to the circumstances under which a state could not exclude a potential juror, not
necessarily when the State could exclude a potential juror. Id.
76. Id. at 424 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
77. id. at 425-26.
78. Id. at 430, 435. Justice Brennan's dissent criticized the court for departing from its view that "risks to
a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights from a jury from which those who oppose capital punishment have been
excluded as far more serious than the risk to the State from inclusion of particular jurors whose views about the
death penalty might turn out to predispose them toward the defendant." Id. at 445 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
80. Seemingly, the Court would revisit the invitation left open in Witherspoon. See supra note 59 and
accompanying text.
81. McCree, 476 U.S. at 166.
82. Id.
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to have guilt determined by an impartial jury. 3 In federal district court, McCree
presented multiple social science studies on the relationship between deathqualification and its effect on the guilt phase in a bifurcated trial."
1. Studies
The district court opinion presented McCree's studies at length and concluded
that death-qualified juries were more prone to convict than non-death-qualified
juries." The court discussed the three studies from Witherspoon86 that had been
completed and published in the interim.87 In addition, McCree submitted additional
studies from Zeisel, 88 Jurow, 89 Harris,' Ellsworth, 91 Haney,92 and Cowan. 93
In Zeisel's study, jurors who had participated in actual felony trials were
surveyed following their jury duty. 94 Participants were asked their views on capital
punishment and their voting patterns in the actual felony cases on which they
served. 95 They were asked how they voted on their first ballot, and what the full
jury's first vote was. Zeisel determined the relative strength of the cases, 96 and
found that there was a correlation between non-scrupled jurors and a tendency to
vote in favor of the defendant in close cases.9 7
In Jurow's 1971 study, 211 employees at a company plant participated after work
hours.98 The participants rated their views on the death penalty in one of five
categories, with the higher category indicating stronger support of the death
penalty.99 The participants then listened to audio-recorded simulated cases and

83. Id. at 167. McCree also challenged the conviction based on the claim that his jury was not selected from
a representative cross section of the community because of the exclusion of Witherspoon-excludables. Id.
84. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983), overruled by Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S.
162 (1986).
85. Grigsby, 569 F. Supp. at 1323. Many of the studies were also discussed and given approval in Keeten
v. Garrison, 578 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D.N.C. 1984), rev'd, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984).
86. Wilson, supra note 46; Goldberg, supra note 54; H. Zeisel, Some Insights into the Operation of
CriminalJuries (Nov. 1957) (confidential first draft, Univ. of Chicago).
87. Grigsby, 569 F. Supp. at 1290.
88. Zeisel, supranote 86.
89. George L. Jurow, New Dataon the Effect of a "Death Qualified" Jury on the Guilt Determination
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 567 (1971).
90. Welsh White, The ConstitutionalInvalidity of Convictions Imposed by Death-QualifiedJuries, 58
CORNELL L. REv. 1176 (1973).
91. Ellsworth et al., JurorAttitudesand ConvictionProneness:The Relationshipbetween Attitudes towards
the Death Penalty and Predispositionto Convict (1979) (prepub. draft). Ellsworth's collection of five studies is
discussed at length in Hovey v. Superior Court, 616 P.2d 1301, 1323 (1980).
92. Lois Harris & Associates, Inc., Study No. 2016 (1971).
93. Cowan et. al, The Effects of Death Qualification on Juror's Predispositionto Convict and on the
Quality of Deliberation,8 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 53 (1984).
94. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1276, 1295 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1295-96 (To determine the strength of the evidence in an actual trial, Zeisel looked at split votes
from the juries. For example, if eleven jurors voted to convict, and a single juror voted to acquit, then Zeisel
considered the evidence for conviction strong. This base line approach to the strength of the case was approved by
the district court.).
97. Id. at 1296.
98. Jurow, supra note 89 (cited in Grigsby, 569 F. Supp. at 1296).
99. Grigsby, 569 F. Supp. at 1297 (citing Jurow, supra note 89). The categories were as follows:
1. I could not vote for the death penalty regardless of the facts and circumstances of the case.
2. There are some kinds of cases in which I know I could not vote for the death penalty even
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indicated if they would vote to acquit or convict."° The data demonstrated a
correlation between participants who more strongly favored the death penalty and
those who voted to convict.''
In a survey conducted by Louis Harris and Associates and published in the
Cornell Law Review, a national sample of 2,068 adults were administered a survey
in person. 2 The poll identified which jurors would be classified as Witherspoonexcludables for unwillingness to vote for the death penalty.0 3 After receiving
criminal case descriptions and uniform jury instructions, the subjects were asked to
vote to acquit or convict."° The study found that people who favor the death penalty
are more likely to convict than those who could never vote for the death penalty.'0 5
While describing the findings of the studies, the district court noted that they had
not taken into account "nullifiers." 1 06 These arejurors whose opposition to the death
penalty is so fervent that they will fail to find guilt in any capital case for fear of a
possible sentence of death. 7 If subjects who will vote to acquit in any case were
unaccounted for, they would distort actual rates of death-qualification's effect on
proneness to convict.
Ellsworth's studies, also submitted to the district court, took "nullifiers" into
account. Subjects in these studies were taken from actual jury rolls in Califomia.'0 8
After a screening question identified "nullifiers,""0 the remaining participants were
subdivided into two groups resulting in 258 death-qualified subjects and thirty
Witherspoon-excludables." Juries were composed of both categories of subjects
with any particular jury containing no more than four Witherspoon-excludables.,"
The juries watched a two-hour reenactment of an actual Massachusetts trial which
included opening/closing statements, direct/cross examinations, and jury instructions." 2 The jurors then voted for first-degree murder, second-degree murder,
manslaughter, and acquittal.

if the law allowed me to, but others in which I would be willing to consider it.
3. I would consider all of the penalties provided by the law and the facts and circumstances of
the particular case.
4. I would usually vote for the death penalty in a case where the law allows me to.
5. I would always vote for the death penalty in a case where the law allows me to.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. White, supra note 92, at 1178, 1185 (cited in Grigsby, 569 F. Supp. at 1297).
103. Grigsby,569 F. Supp. at 1298 (The question asked was, "[whether in a murder trial] there would be any
situation in which you might vote for the death penalty, or do you think you could never vote for the death penalty,
regardless of the circumstances?").
104. White, supra note 90, at 1186.
105. Id. Note that those who are unable to vote for the death penalty are excludable under the Witherspoon
standard. The study also described those with "relatively low scruples against the death penalty [as]
disproportionately authoritarian, conservative, and punitive." Id.
106. Grigbsy, 569 F. Supp. at 1298.
107. See id. at 1290-91.
108. Ellsworth supra note 91 (cited in Grigsby, 569 F. Supp. at 1299).
109. Id. Subjects who agreed with the following statement were eliminated from the experiment: "I would
not be fair and impartial in deciding the question of guilt or innocence, knowing that if the person was convicted
he or she might get the death penalty." Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1299-1300 (The district court described the videotaped trial to be a "high quality and realistic
stimulus.").
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The results of Ellsworth' s study demonstrated that death-qualified subjects were
25 percent more likely to vote for guilt than their Witherspoon-excludable
counterparts." 3 For the district court, the study marked "the culmination of some
fifteen years of research demonstrating the divergent juror voting propensities of
death-qualified versus excludable jurors.""' 4 Thus, the district court concluded that
the exclusion of jurors through the death-qualification process results in a
"substantially lessen[ed] likelihood" of acquittal or guilt of a lesser offense. 5
The Haney study also demonstrated the adverse effect death-qualification has on
otherwise qualified jurors. After eliminating non-eligible jurors, including
"nullifiers" and Witherspoon-excludables,the remaining subjects were divided into
two groups.'1 6 Both groups watched videotaped simulated trials with only one
difference between the tapes:" 7 one tape included the voir dire associated with
death-qualification, while the other did not. 8 The results of the study showed that
the subjects exposed to death-qualification were more likely to convict the
defendant, assume the defendant was guilty before the trial began, assume the law
disapproves of people who oppose the death penalty, more likely to assume all
parties involved (including the judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney) believe the
defendant is guilty, and are more likely to believe the defendant deserves the death
penalty." 9 According to the results of the study, death-qualification results in jurors
believing the only real issue is whether
or not to impose death; not necessarily the
20
determination of guilt or innocence.
In one of the most far-reaching studies that questioned whether death-qualified
juries were more likely to convict, Cowan reached a demonstrative connection
between death-qualification and guilt-prone juries.12' Cowan's study involved over
288 subjects who watched an in-depth videotaped simulated trial of a homicide in22
which the evidence reasonably supported a verdict of either guilt and innocence.1
The subjects were placed into twelve-memberjuries that either included only jurors
who would vote to impose the death penalty, or included two to four jurors who
would be excluded, in an actual trial, for their unwillingness to impose the death
penalty.123 Subjects indicated how they would vote on a verdict both immediately
after the video and after deliberating with their assigned jury. 24

113. Id. at 1300 (The statistical differences between death-qualified jurors and Witherspoon-excludableswith
respect to first or second degree murder were insignificant. However, when the results are categorized between
guilty (first/second degree murder and manslaughter) and acquittal, 77.9 percent of death-qualified jurors voted
to convict compared to 53.3 percent of Witherspoon-excludables. In addition, 46.7 percent of Witherspoonexcludables voted to acquit as compared to 22.1 percent of death-qualified jurors.).
114. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1301 (E.D. Ark. 1983), overruledby Lockhart v. McCree, 476
U.S. 162 (1986).
115. Id.
116. Craig Haney, Aida Hurtado, and Luis Vega, "Modem" Death Qualification:New Dataon Its Biasing
Effects, 18 LAw & HuM. BERAV. 619 (1994) (cited in Grigsby, 569 F. Supp. at 1302-1303).
117. Id. at 1303.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Cowan, supra note 93.
122. Id. at 61-66.
123. Id. at 61.
124. Id. at 65-66.
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The study found strong support for the hypothesis that death-qualified jurors
convict at a higher rate. 2 5 Thirteen point seven percent of death-qualified jurors
voted not guilty after deliberation, while 34.5 percent of the excludables voted not
guilty after deliberation. Indeed, the study indicated that more death-qualified jurors
than excludables found prosecution witnesses credible.'2 6
Based upon the data from the studies as well as "reason and common sense," the
district court concluded that death-qualified jurors are substantially more prone to
convict than non-death-qualified jurors. 2 7 McCree had succeeded in persuading the
district court that death-qualification resulted in a jury more likely to convict and
his conviction was overturned. 28 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding.'29 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.'3
2. Rejection of Studies
Unfortunately for McCree, the Supreme Court found "serious flaws" in the
13 2
3
evidence presented in the form of the studies.' ' Of the fifteen studies presented,
the Court found that only six dealt with the effect of removal of Witherspoonexcludables on the guilt/innocence phase. 33
' Three of those studies were also before
the Court in Witherspoon and were summarily rejected, despite the fact that the
studies had been completed following the 1968 decision.' 34 The remaining three
studies were deficient in as much as they did not concern "actual" and "sworn"
jurors applying law to the facts of an "actual case involving the fate of an actual
defendant."' 35 Further, only one of the remaining studies attempted simulated deathqualification and none attempted to predict to what extent Witherspoon-excludables
would have an impact on the guilt determination outcome of a full jury. 13 6 Finally,
' Thus, the Court was
only one study properly excluded "nullifiers." 137
unwilling to
impose a far reaching per se constitutional rule based upon the evidence offered.'38
125. Id. at 68 (Death-qualified jurors voted for guilt at arate of 77.9 percent, while Witherspoon-excludables
voted at a rate of 53.3 percent.).
126. Id. at 69-70.
127. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1294 (E.D. Ark. 1983), overruled by Lockhart v. McCree, 476
U.S. 162 (1986).
128. Id. at 1324.
129. Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd Lockhart v. McCree, 474 U.S. 816 (1985).
130. Lockhart v. McCree, 474 U.S. 816 (1985).
131. Id. at 168.
132. This discussion addressed only five studies because they bore directly on the issue of death qualification
and its effect on guilt proneness. It omitted studies that supported McCree's argument that death qualification
resulted in a jury unrepresentative of a fair cross section of the community. For a full discussion of the remaining
studies, see Hovey v. Superior CourtofAlameda County, 616 P.2d 1301 (1980), supersededby statute,CAL. CIr.
PROC. CODE § 223 (West 1990), as recognized in, Covarrubias v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 4th 1168 (Ct. App.
1998).
133. McCree, 476 U.S. at 169 n.4.
134. The Wilson, Goldberg, and Zeisel studies were before the Court in Witherspoon.To the McCree Court,
"if these studies were too 'tentative and fragmentary'... in 1968, the same [unchanged] studies... are still
insufficient." Id. at 171. However, the studies were not "unchanged" and the district court noted that the Zeisel and
Goldberg studies are now "thorough and complete." Grigsby, 569 F. Supp. at 1290.
135. McCree, 476 U.S. at 171 (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 171-72.
137. Id. at 172.
138. Id. at 172-73. In contrast, Justice Marshall found sufficient evidence that death qualification
"predisposes the jurors that survive itto believe that the defendant is guilty." Id. at 188 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Despite the rejection of McCree's studies, the Court assumed for purposes of the
opinion that the studies indicated that death-qualification "produces juries
somewhat more 'conviction-prone' than 'non-death-qualified' j uries." 3 9 Even with
this assumption, the Court held that death-qualification was constitutional and
rejected McCree' s arguments."4
McCree argued that he did not have an impartial jury because exclusion of
Witherspoon-excludables "slanted" the resulting jury in favor of guilt.' 4 ' To
McCree, an impartial jury is one in which less conviction-prone jurors are not
excluded while their prosecution-biased peers remain.'
However, the Court did
not adopt McCree's definition of an impartial jury, stating that, "an impartial jury
consists of nothing more than jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and
find the facts.' ' 143 Holding otherwise, the Court noted, would result in a complicated
"balancing" of jurors to ensure that an equal number of opposite members for a
particular issue or viewpoint were represented.'"
In addition, the Court characterized McCree's reliance on Witherspoon as
misplaced. In Witherspoon, the State of Illinois was found to have no legitimate
interest in its broad rule of exclusion of jurors with scruples against the death
45
penalty without evidence that such scruples would interfere with the juror's oath.
In McCree's case, in contrast, the Arkansas legislature provided for a single jury to
decide all of the issues in the defendant's case.'" The two questions of guilt and
sentence "are necessarily interwoven" and the same jury must shoulder the burden
of both. 47
' Twojuries would require two presentations of evidence which, adopting
the reasoning of the Arkansas Supreme Court, "could not be consistently fair to the
State and perhaps not even to the accused."' 14 8 Neither the Arkansas court nor the
United States Supreme Court elaborated on how two trials would result in
unfairness to the state or defendant. " 9 In sum, the Court found a sufficient interest
for the state in its preference for a unitary jury in a bifurcated capital trial 5 ' and
rejected defining jury impartiality in terms of a balance of individual juror

Instead of "haphazard jabs" at the individual methodologies and results of the studies, the body of evidence resulted
in unanimity. Id. at 189. For a further discussion of the studies presented in McCree, see Rogers Elliot, Social
Science Dataand the APA: The Lockhart Briefas a Case in Point, 15 LAw&HUM. BEHAV. 59 (1991) and Phoebe
C. Ellsworth, To Tell What We Know or Waitfor Godot?, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 77 (1991).
139. McCree, 476 U.S. at 173.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 177.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 178 (emphasis omitted) (internal citation omitted).
144. Id. For example, a court might have to balance the number of Republicans with the number of
Democrats on the jury. Id.
145. Id. at 180 (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)).
146. ARK. CODE ANN § 41-1301(3) (1977) (cited in McCree, 476 U.S. at 180).
147. McCree, 476 U.S. at 181 (citing Rector v. Arkansas, 659 S.W.2d 168, 173 (Ark. 1983)). The high court
in Arkansas, in an argument against two consecutive trials in a capital case, wrote: "[A] second trial would be
comparable to having the actors in a play, after the audience has left the theater, repeat their lines in a second
performance for a few spectators in a nearly empty house." Rector, 659 S.W.2d at 173.
148. McCree, 476 U.S. at 181 (citing Rector, 659 S.W.2d at 173).
149. Inferentially, two trials may be "unfair" to the State in as much as the State would have to expend
additional resources. As for unfairness to a defendant, the court briefly discusses the doctrine of "residual doubt."
See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
150. McCree, 476 U.S. at 182.
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viewpoints. 5 ' Thus, the Court concluded that death-qualification
of jurors in a
1 52
capital trial did not violate the federal constitution.
This series of Supreme Court cases, beginning with Witherspoon, provide the
framework for the current death-qualification of juries in capital cases. In a later
case that expanded the Court's death-qualification jurisprudence, Morgan v.
Illinois,153 a defendant was given the ability to challenge "reverse Witherspoonexcludables."' 5 4 Under Morgan, a defendant is constitutionally entitled to remove
a juror for cause if that juror "will automatically vote for the death penalty
' The state is allowed to challenge veniremen
irrespective of the facts [or the] law."155
for cause if a particular person's opposition to the death penalty would substantially
interfere with that juror's compliance with his or her oath.
ImI. NEW MEXICO'S ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL DEATHQUALIFICATION STANDARD
New Mexico courts have adopted the United State Supreme Court's approach to
death-qualification of capital juries. However, a review of New Mexico
jurisprudence on challenges to capital juries does not reveal an in-depth review of
death-qualification and its relationship to guilt-prone juries. Indeed, New Mexico
case law on the topic is little more than a verbatim adoption of federal jurisprudence. Thus, a full analysis of evidence of conviction-prone juries and the deathqualification process has yet to be conducted in a New Mexico appellate court.
In State v. Trujillo,15 6 the New Mexico Supreme Court's first foray into modem
death-qualification,' 5 7 the defendant argued that the process of death-qualification
violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a representative and fair
jury. 5 The trial court examined the studies discussed in Hovey v. Superior Court
ofAlameda County.," which Trujillo submitted. However, the court did not discuss
nor review the studies because it thought it "unnecessary to reconsider [a] doctrine
so clearly expressed by the United States Supreme Court.""

151.

Id. at 183.

152. Id. at 183-84. McCree also argued that exclusion ofjurors who opposed the death penalty violated his
right to a jury represented by a fair-cross-section of the community. See id. at 173-77. However, the Court rejected
this argument because, in part, jurors opposed to the death penalty did not qualify as a "distinct" group for purposes
of the cross-section requirement. Id.
153. 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
154. Id. at 729.
155. Id.
156. 99 N.M. 251, 657 P.2d 107 (1983).
157. All subsequent New Mexico cases that discuss the issue of death qualification rely upon Trujillo. No
other case is cited in later opinions on the issue. In State v. Trivitt, 89 N.M. 162, 548 P.2d 442 (1976), the New
Mexico Supreme Court adopted the Witherspoonstandard for capital jurors: "nothing we say today bears upon the
power of a State to execute a defendant sentenced to death by a jury from which the only veniremen who were in
fact excluded for cause were those who made unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against
the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case
before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial
decision as to the defendant's guilt." Id. at 165 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968)). The
court overturned Trivitt's sentence on other grounds. Id. at 169.
158. Trujillo, 99 N.M. at 252, 657 P.2d at 108.
159. 616 P.2d 1301 (Cal. 1980).
160. Trujillo, 99 N.M. at 252, 657 P.2d at 108.
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The following year, in State v. Hutchinson,16 1 the defendant appealed the trial
court's death-qualification of potential jurors before the sentencing phase, rather
than waiting until a determination of guilt. 162 After dismissing the defendant's
argument by referring to Trujillo' s recent holding, the New Mexico Supreme Court
stated that the established system of capital voir dire was "the only reasonable
manner...in which [it] can be conducted."' 163 The court also ruled against a similar
argument in State v. Simonson,'64 referring to Hutchinson'sholding. 165 There were
practical reasons for refusing to implement new capital jury procedures. For
example, the Uniform Jury Instructions would have to be modified to ask jurors if
they could find a defendant guilty knowing that a different person could impose
death based on that verdict." 6 In addition, the selection criteria for jurors would
67
argument was "emphatically
have to reflect this difference. 1
68 Thus, the defendant's
rejected.
and unequivocally"
Justice Stowers in State v. Gilbert169 also declined to discuss studies that
highlighted death-qualification and its relationship to conviction-prone juries. 70
Gilbert challenged his conviction and sentence of death, in part, because the deathqualification process results in a conviction-prone jury. ''However, a simple stringcite to both72 Trujillo and Hutchinson was enough for the court in dismissing the
argument.
The later case of State v. Sutphin 173 marked New Mexico's adoption of Witt. In
Sutphin, the New Mexico Supreme Court denied the defendant's challenge of the
removal for cause of two jurors who first indicated that the death penalty would
affect their decisions, and later indicated that the death penalty would not affect
their decision.' 74 The court found that the potential jurors were properly excused for
cause under the Witt standard.' 75 The case also recognized the state's strong interest
in death-qualification. 176State v. Allen 177 provided this pithy statement of reasoning:
"For purposes of disqualifying an individual from serving on a jury in a death
penalty case, it is the fact that the individual's vote will be automatic, rather
17 than
the particular reasons he or she gives for casting such an automatic vote.' 1

161. 99 N.M. 616, 661 P.2d 1315 (1983).
162. Id. at 619, 661 P.2d at 1318.
163. Id. at 620, 661 P.2d at 1319.
164. 100 N.M. 297, 669 P.2d 1092 (1983).
165. Id. at 299-300, 669 P.2d at 1094-95.
166. Id. at 300, 669 P.2d at 1095.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 100 N.M. 392, 671 P.2d 640 (1983).
170. Id. at 396, 671 P.2d at 644.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 107 N.M. 126, 753 P.2d 1314 (1988).
174. Id. at 128-29, 753 P.2d at 1316-17.
175. Id.
176. Id. ("The [United States Supreme] Court also.. .recognized the state's legitimate interest in excluding
those jurors whose opposition to capital punishment would not allow them to view the proceedings impartially, and
who therefore might frustrate the administration of a state's death penalty scheme.") (citing Wainwright v. Witt,
469 U.S. 412,416 (1989).
177. 2000-NMSC-002, 994 P.2d 728.
178. Id. 1 86, 994 P.2d at 758.
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In sum, from Trujillo to Allen, the New Mexico Supreme Court failed to fully
analyze a constitutional challenge to the death-qualification process with respect to
its effects on the impartiality of a jury and, without much analysis, the New Mexico
courts adopted federal jury death-qualification reasoning and holdings. Seven years
after the Allen decision was handed down, the court, in State v. Fry,'79 had another
opportunity to reexamine death-qualification and its effect on the capital jury.
IV. STATE V. FRY
A. Introduction
The case of State v. Fry presented the Supreme Court of New Mexico with a
challenge to the practice of death qualification. Fry's conviction and subsequent
appeal to the court produced an opinion that reaffirned the State's practice of
empanelling a death-qualified jury.
B. Overview
Robert Fry was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, attempted criminal
sexual penetration, and tampering with evidence in connection with the murder of
a Farmington woman.180 After the jury specified a sentence of death, the trial court
affirmed the sentence.' 8' Fry appealed his conviction and sentence,' 82 asserting,
inter alia,8 3 the exclusion of prospective jury members who opposed the death
penalty for religious reasons violated his constitutional right to an impartial jury
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution, and
Article II, Section Fourteen' 84 of the New Mexico Constitution. 185 He argued that
the exclusion of jurors who opposed the death penalty on religious grounds during

179. 2006-NMSC-001, 126 P.3d 516.
180. Id. 1,126 P.3d at 519.
181. Id.; see also NMSA 1978, § 31-18-14(A) (1993).
182. Fry, 2006-NMSC-001, 1 1, 126 P.3d at 519.
183. Fry also argued that the underlying felony of kidnapping could not be used as aggravating factor since
the jury did not specify if it arrived at first degree murder through felony murder. NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-5 (1981).
Justice Bosson criticized the majority for falling to correct this:
If the State used the same kidnapping, both to define first-degree felony murder and then to
aggravate that same conviction to make it death eligible, how then has the State truly narrowed
the death penalty to only those most heinous offenses? If the jury was not asked to find
something significantly more about Defendant than what it had already found in convicting him,
then we have a constitutional dilemma on our hands.
Fry, 2006-NMSC-001, 172, 126 P.3d at 544 (Bosson, J., dissenting in part).
184. Article I, Section Fourteen, of the New Mexico Constitution provides in relevant part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend himself in
person, and by counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have the charge and testimony interpreted to him in a language that
he understands; to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of necessary witnesses
in his behalf, and a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed.
N.M. CONST. art. IL § 14.
185. Fry also cited to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo to support his argument that civil rights should not
be denied on account of religious beliefs. Brief of Appellant at 17, State v. Fry, 2006-NMSC-001, 126 P.3d 516
(citing Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement, art. IX, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922, 930). The
court quickly dismissed this argument as the treaty does not contain any protections of religion independent of the
federal and state constitutions. Fry, 2006-NMSC-001, 1 7 n.2, 126 P.3d at 521 n.2.
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the guilt/innocence phase of the trial results in a biased jury in favor of the
prosecution that is more likely to convict."8 6 Fry's brief referenced the effect deathqualification has on the guilt/innocence phase of a capital trial: "[T]he use of a
'death-qualified' venire results in a jury that is biased in favor of the prosecution,
is more likely to convict and to give greater sentences.' 8 7 For support, Fry briefly
mentioned two sociological studies.' 8
To accommodate the state's interest in a death-qualified jury for the penalty
phase of a bifurcated trial, Fry suggested impaneling the jurors who would
otherwise be excluded under Witherspoon during the guilt/innocence phase, and
replacing those jurors with alternates if necessary for the subsequent guilt phase.' 9
This procedure, Fry argued, is authorized under existing court rules on alternate
jurors. 9 ° Thus, the court would impanel additional death-qualified jurors to account
for the possible exclusion of non-qualified jurors during the penalty phase.' 91 The
court, in a unanimous opinion,' 92 ultimately rejected Fry's arguments. 93
C. Court's Reasoning
The court began by citing Wainwright v. Witt 94 noting that a prospective juror
is excluded if "the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his
oath."' 95 The court then acknowledged that this standard also applied to New
Mexico capital jurors 196 and explained that a trial court's discretion in excluding 9a7
juror will not be disturbed "absent a clear abuse of discretion or a manifest error." 1
Having set out the legal standards surrounding death-qualification in New
Mexico, the court then dismissed Fry's proposed solution under Rule 5-704(A)
NMRA.' 98 In so doing, the court determined that the rule was meant to effectuate

186. Brief of Appellant at 8-9, State v. Fry, 2006-NMSC-001, 126 P.3d 516. Fry also argued that the
exclusion of individual jurors for cause because of religious opposition to the death penalty violated Article VI,
Section Three of the New Mexico Constitution, "The right of any citizen of the state to vote, hold office or sit upon
juries, shall never be restricted, abridged or impaired on account of religion..." N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
187. Brief of Appellant at 9, State v. Fry, 2006-NMSC-001, 126 P.3d 516.
188. Cowan, supra note 93; William C. Thompson et al., Death PenaltyAttitudes and Conviction Proneness:
The Translationof Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 95 (1984). Thompson's findings were part of
the Ellsworth studies discussed in McCree. See supra notes 79, 91.
189. Fry, 2006-NMSC-001, 111, 126 P.3d at 522.
190. See Rule 5-704(A) NMRA (prior to Apr. 19, 2004 amendment).
191. Fry, 2006-NMSC-001, 1 11, 126 P.3d at 523.
192. Justice Bosson's concurrence related to the underlying felony and aggravating circumstances. See supra
note 183.
193. Fry, 2006-NMSC-001, 11, 126 P.3d at 522.
194. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
195. Fry, 2006-NMSC-001, 8, 126 P.3d at 521 (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985)
(internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
196. Fry, 2006-NMSC-001, 9, 126 P.3d at 522 ("'The trial court may properly exclude a juror for cause if
the juror's views would substantially impair the performance of the juror's duties in accordance with the
instructions and oath.") (citing State v. Clark, 1999-NMSC-035, 10, 990 P.2d 793, 801).
197. Fry, 2006-NMSC-001, 1 10, 126 P.3d at 522 (citing State v. Sutphin, 107 N.M. 126, 130, 753 P.2d
1314, 1318 (1988)).
198. Id. 7 12, 126 P.3d at 523. The court also described how there would be no meaningful distinction
between prospective jurors who would automatically vote against a death sentence and those who would
automatically vote for a death sentence. Id. 15 n.3, 126 P.3d at 524 n.3.
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the Capital Felony Sentencing Act 99 that requires "the sentencing proceeding [to
be] conducted.. .before the original jury.''2°°Thus, the court reasoned, the legislature
intended for capital sentencing to involve the original jury, not the alternatej ury Fry
had suggested. 20 1 Any modifications to the single jury-system would "frustrate" the
Legislature's intent. 202 Additionally, reading Rule 5-704(A) NMRA requires
consideration of Rule 5-605(B) NMRA 2005 which limits the number of alternate
jurors available to a district judge to six. 20 3 The court also looked to Rule 5-606(C)
NMRA 2005 and determined that it does not allow for excusal of jurors for one part
of a trial because of their inability to follow their oath.2"4
Interestingly, the court looked to Rector v. State20 5 in support of the underlying
legislative purpose in a single jury system for capital trials.20 6 The court supplied
three reasons in support of the policy of having a single jury in a capital trial. First,
in what appears to be a conservation of judicial resources argument, both phases of
the trial are "interwoven" and demand "consideration of similar evidence." 20 7
Secondly, the doctrine of residual doubt suggests that a single jury can benefit to a
defendant of having a single jury.2 °8 Finally, and echoing McCree, repetitive trials
for two juries would not likely be fair to either party. 2° This, of course, was not at
issue in Fry's case considering his proposed solution for additional alternate jurors
to replace Witherspoon-excludablesin the event of a sentencing phase. 21 Still, the
court cited to the dissent in Grigsby v. Mabry,21 ' "jurors... cannot evade the heavy
responsibility placed
upon them of whether a convicted person should receive the
'2 12
death penalty."
The court shifted its analysis to Fry's claim that a death-qualified jury is more
prone to convict. 2 3 First, the court considered it significant that in addition to the
seven excused veniremembers at issue, the trial court excused at least nineteen prospectivejurors because they stated they would automatically impose a death sentence
upon a first-degree murder conviction and one aggravating circumstance. 214 Thus,
any disadvantage to Fry was "offset" by excluding automatic votes in favor of the
death penalty.21 5

199. NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-l(B) (1979).
200. Id.
201. Given the text of NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-I(B) (1979), a change to the unitary jury system currently in
place may require legislative action. See discussion infra.
202. Fry, 2006-NMSC-I, 12, 126 P.3d at 523.
203. Rule 5-605(B) NMRA 2005 ("In a criminal case, the district court may direct that not more than six
jurors, in addition to the regular jury, be called and impaneled to sit as alternate jurors.").
204. Fry, 2006-NMSC-I, 14, 126 P.3d at 524.
205. 659 S.W.2d 168 (Ark. 1983).
206. Fry, 2006-NMSC-1, 13, 126 P.3d at 523. Rectorreliedupon theMcCree opinion. See Part ILC supra.
207. Fry, 2006-NMSC-I, 13, 126 P.3d at 523 (citing Rector v. State, 659 S.W.2d 168, 173 (Ark. 1983)).
208. See infra note 269.
209. Fry, 2006-NMSC-I, 13, 126 P.3d at 523.
210. Fry proposed impaneling extra jurors during the guilt/innocence phase that would be used for purposes
of death qualification if necessary. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
211. 758 F.2d 226, 243 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
212. Fry, 2006-NMSC-I, 13, 126 P.3d at 524 (citing Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 247 (8th Cir.
1985)(Gibson, J. dissenting) rev'd sub num. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986)).
213. Fry, 2006-NMSC-I,
15-16, 126 P.3d at 524-26.
214. Jd. 15, 126 P.3d at 524.
215. Id. 15, 126 P.3d at 525.
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According to the court, there is a very real concern about prospective jurors who,
in their opposition to the death penalty, admitted an effect on "their ability to be fair
in the determination of guilt or innocence." 2 6 In an act of speculation, the court
reasoned, "our Legislature... might have concluded that such prospective jurors
could not reasonably be expected to set aside their beliefs about the death
penalty... knowing that the sentence they vehemently oppose could, based on their
vote, be considered by other jurors." 2 7 Further, the parties did not fully explore this
concern in the voir dire.2"' Indeed, in reiterating the court's reasoning in State v.
Simonson,21 9 the Uniform Jury Instructions would have to be changed to question
jurors present only for the guilt/innocence phase whether they could follow their
duty knowing that they would not play a role in the final determination of the
sentence. 220 Thus, the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected Fry's solution to the
guilt tilting effect of jury death-qualification through additional alternate jurors. In
sum, according to Fry, the trial court was within its discretion to excuse jurors for
both phases of Fry's trial who indicate that their opposition to the death penalty
would prohibit imposition of the death penalty in any circumstance. 221
The court in Fry did not focus upon the underlying argument that a deathqualified jury results in a jury that is more conviction prone. Instead, the New
Mexico Supreme Court continued to follow federal death-qualification jurisprudence without a full consideration of the sociological data on the effect deathqualification has on the guilt/innocence phase of a capital trial.
V. CAPITAL JURY PROJECT
A. Introduction
Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in McCree,222 the future
of using sociological studies to support constitutional challenges to the death
penalty was unclear. The McCree Court summarily dismissed a wide array of
studies that supported a finding of basic violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.223 If future studies were to have any weight with the Court, they
would need to concern "actualjurors" in "actualtrials" concerning "actualdefendants., 224 The Capital Jury Project, discussed infra, may be just the type of study
the Court contemplated.
The Capital Jury Project (CJP) was an extensive research and data collection
effort that sought to demonstrate the continued systemic problems inherent in the
administration of the death penalty in the United States. 225 Funded in part by the

216. Id. 1 16, 126 P.3d at 525.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
220. Fry, 2006-NMSC-1, 16, 126 P.3d at 526.
221. Id. 7 17, 126 P.3d at 526.
222. See Part Il.C supra.
223. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
225. See William J. Bowers, The CapitalJury Project:Rationale, Design,and Preview of Early Findings,
70 IND. L.J. 1043 (1995).
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National Science Foundation and beginning in 1990,226 the CJP has interviewed
1,201 jurors in 354 capital trials in fourteen states.227 Interviews were conducted
with at least four randomly selected jurors from actual capital trials that resulted in
either a death sentence or the state's alternative sentence.228 Interviews adhered to
a protocol and took an average of 3.5 hours to complete. 229 The interview asked a
wide variety of questions that sought to chronicle the individual jurors' thoughts
and decision-making process throughout the trial.23 ° Interviews were then
transcribed and analyzed by graduate students and sociologists. Results from the
project have yielded in-depth insight into the functioning of capital juries. 231 With

data from actualjurors in actualtrials concerning actual defendants, the CJP results
are extremely probative and persuasive.
B. Findings
In a 1998 article, CJP researchers discussed the very real problem of premature
jury sentencing decisions. Almost half of the jurors interviewed admitted reaching
a decision on the defendant's sentence during the guilt/innocence phase of the
trial.232 On average, 49.2 percent of jurors prematurely decided on the defendant's
sentence prior to the sentencing stage. Of jurors who decided upon a sentence prematurely, 30.3 percent chose death and 18.9 percent chose a life sentence.233 Only
2.6 percent of early death supporters felt "not too sure" thought about changing
their minds, while over 70 percent were "absolutely convinced" of their decision.234

226. Id. at 1043 n.1.
227. William J. Bowers and Wanda D. Foglia, Still Singularly Agonizing: Law's Failure to Purge
Arbitrarinessfrom Capital Sentencing, 39 CRIM. L. BuLL. 51 (2003). Jurors from the following states were

included: Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Kentucky, Missouri, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. The diversity ofjurisdictions involved in the study

result in a collection of data that "can be reasonably applied in New Mexico.. as the findings of the CJP are
applicable nationally to a reasonable scientific certainty." Defendant Good's Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law at 6, State v. Good, No. CR 2004-00522 (on file with the author). See Part VI infra.
228. Bowers, supranote 227, at 55.

229. Id.
230.

Bowers, supranote 225, at 1082.

The interview instrument is a mixture of both structured questions with designated response
options and open-ended questions that occasionally invite lengthy narrative descriptions of
issues such as the crime and the jury's sentencing deliberations. It contains many explicit
interviewing instructions. All questions and response options were read verbatim by the
interviewer, and open-ended questions were typically accompanied by instructions about areas
or issues to be probed. To convey both the general orientation of these interviews and to identify
the types of problems and difficulties that some interviewers have experienced, a 15-page
Interviewers' Guide was prepared that emphasizes the importance of encouraging respondents
to take as much time as they need to relate everything they regard as relevant.
Id. at 1082 n.206.
231. For a survey of academic literature based on the CJP data, see http://www.albany.edu/scj/CJPpubs.htm
(last visited Sept. 21, 2008) (list of publications based upon CJP data).
232. William J. Bowers, Maria Sandys & Benjamin D. Steiner, Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital
Sentencing: Jurors' Predispositions,Guilt-TrialExperience, and PrematureDecision Making, 83 CoRNELL. L.
REv. 1476, 1488 (1998).
233. Bowers, supra note 227, at 56.

234. Id. at 57.
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The majority of death supporters did not waiver from their premature decision
throughout the remainder of the trial.235
This particular data demonstrates a clear failure of the bifurcated capital trial
system. Jurors are explicitly instructed not to consider sentencing until after the
guilt/innocence phase.2 3 6 Jurors must wait for the presentation of aggravating factors
and mitigating circumstances in the sentencing stage before making up their
minds.237 Indeed, deciding upon a sentence without proper administration of
constitutionally-protected procedures is no better than the "arbitrary" decisions of
life or death declared unconstitutional in Furman.2 3' The limitations on jury
discretion in Gregg and its progeny that satisfied the concerns in Furman are
ineffective with actual jurors as demonstrated by this finding of the CJP.
Another troubling finding of the CJP is the inclusion of jurors that, according to
McCree, are prohibited from sitting on a capital jury. Namely, jurors who believe
the death penalty is the only appropriate sentence for certain types of murder, by
definition, fail to consider aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances as
constitutionally required. 239 These automatic death penalty (ADP)j urors present the
opposite of Witherspoon-excludables.24 In one survey, 26 percent of jurors, based
on the heinous nature of the crime, prematurely determined the defendant should
242
die.241 Indeed, ADP jurors vastly outnumber Witherspoon-excludables.
The result is a system of capital juries that over-excludes Witherspoon-excludable jurors and under-excludes ADP jurors. 243 The findings of the CJP support the
conclusions of the sociological studies presented in McCree. Capitaljuries, because
of the death-qualification process, are more prone to convict a defendant. It is this
failure of the system to provide the defendant with a fair and impartial jury under
federal and state constitutions that requires repair. 2'

235. Id. (stating that 59.5 percent of early death penalty supports "never wavered from their initial
[decision]").
236. For example, New Mexico Criminal Uniform Jury Instructions describe the process as follows: "In [the
innocence/guilt] phase the jury decides whether the state has proven the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt. In making this decision the jury cannot consider the consequences of its verdict or any possible sentence."
UJI 14-121 NMRA.

237. "[During sentencing] the jury may hear more evidence and will hear legal instructions and arguments
of counsel. The jury then decides the penalty of life in prison or death." UJI 14-121 NMRA (emphasis added).

238. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
239. See Part I supra.
240. Bowers, supra note 227, at 59.
241. See Sally Contanzo & Mark Costanzo, Life orDeath Decision:An Analysis of CapitalJury Decision
Making Underthe SpecialIssues Sentencing Framework, 18 LAW& HUM. BEHAV. 151, 158 (1994). Specifically,

seven jurors believed that all useful information had been gathered and that the sentencing phase was
"unnecessary." Id.
242. Bowers, supra note 227, at 63 (Seventy-one point six percent of jurors believed death to be the only
appropriate punishment for a defendant with a prior murder conviction, 57.1 percent for planned premeditated
murder, 53.7 percent for murder with multiple victims, 48.9 percent for killing police/prison guard, 46.2 percent
for murder by drug dealer, 24.2 percent for murder during another crime.
243. Id. at 65.
244. The CJP has made other well-founded and supported conclusions regarding the problems associated

with death penaltyjuries. They include "failure to comprehend instructions; erroneous beliefs that death is required;
evasion of responsibility for the punishment decision; racial influence in juror decision making; and underestimation of non-death penalty alternatives." Id. at 54. These failures are significant and constitute unconstitutional practices and might well require abolition of the death penalty as a permissible sentence. That, however, is
beyond the scope of this discussion. Problems in the administration of the death penalty warrant serious
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VI. STATE V. GOOD AND A SUCCESSFUL CHALLENGE TO NEW
MEXICO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
The findings of the Capital Jury Project have succeeded in persuading at least
one New Mexico district court judge that the current capital punishment scheme is
unconstitutional under both the United States and New Mexico Constitutions.245 In
State v. Good, Daniel Good was charged with first-degree murder in connection
with the death of an inmate at the Santa Fe County Jail.246 After the prosecution
indicated that it would seek death, Good filed a "Motion to Dismiss the Death
Penalty on the Ground that the Death Penalty Statute Is Unconstitutional Due to the
Failure to Meet Minimum Constitutional Requirements Set Forth in Furman v.
Georgia and its Progeny."'247 The district court in Santa Fe held a hearing on the
motion in March of 2007, during which Dr. William J. Bowers and Dr. Wanda D.
Foglia 248 testified. 249 Judge Timothy Garcia found that the "premature determination
of the death penalty during the evidentiary (guilt) phase of trial is... an arbitrary and
capricious violation of the United States and New Mexico Constitution. 25 ° Thus,
Good's motion was granted in part to require a second jury to be empanelled during
the sentencing phase of the trial, if necessary. 25' The prosecution subsequently
withdrew the death penalty.252
Following the Good decision, the findings of the CJP are beginning to percolate
through the New Mexico district courts. Recently, a Second Judicial District Court
judge denied a related motion to dismiss the death penalty based upon the CJP
findings, including the testimony of Drs. Bowers and Foglia. 253 Now, with a direct
reconsideration of the practice, even without discussion of the underlying moral implications of state executions.
Id. This article advocates for a tangible and workable solution to the fundamental flaw of guilt proneness of capital
juries.
245. See Order Partially Granting and Partially Denying Motion to Dismiss, State v. Good, No. D-0101-CR200400522 (on file with the author).
246. Id.
247. See Defendant Good's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, State v. Good, No. CR 200400522 (on file with the author).
248. Both Drs. Bowers and Foglia have published findings based upon CJP data. See, e.g., William J. Bowers
et al., The Decision Maker Matters: An EmpiricalExamination of the Way the Role of the Judge and the Jury
Influence Death PenaltyDecision-Making,63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931 (2006); William J.Bowers et aL, Crossing
RacialBoundaries: A Closer Look at the Roots of RacialBias in CapitalSentencing when the Defendantis Black
and the Victim is White, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1497 (2004); William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by
Default: An EmpiricalDemonstrationof False and Forced Choices in CapitalSentencing, 77 TEX. L. REV. 605
(1999); Wanda D. Foglia & William J. Bowers, Shared Sentencing Responsibility: How Hybrid Statutes
Exacerbate the Shortcomings of CapitalJury Decision-Making, 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 663-686 (2006); Wanda D.
Foglia, They Know Not What They Do: UnguidedandMisguidedDecision-Makingin PennsylvaniaCapitalCases,
Justice Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 1 (2003).
249. See Order Partially Granting and Partially Denying Motion to Dismiss, State v. Good, No. D-O l -CR200400522 (on file with the author).
250. Id.
251. Id. Defendant Good's motion was heard before the Honorable Judge Timothy Garcia. Judge Garcia was
recently appointed to the New Mexico Court of Appeals. State Bar of the State of New Mexico, N.M. Court of
Appeals JudicialAppointment, BAR BuLLETIN, Nov. 17, 2008, at 4.
252. Joline Gutierrez Krueger, New Mexico Courts Taking Death Penalty Into Their Own Hands,
ALBUQUERQUETRIBUNE, Jan. 8,2008, availableat httpJ/www.abqtrib.con/news/200/jan/08/new-mexico-courtstaking-death-penalty-their-own-h.
253. See Joline Gutierrez Krueger, Death Penalty on Table; Astorga Attorneys Will Appeal Ruling,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Mar. 15, 2008, at Al.
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appeal pending, the New Mexico Supreme Court will have the opportunity to
directly address and analyze the constitutionality of the death penalty.254 If given its
proper weight and consideration, the findings of the CJP support a finding that the
death penalty in its current form in New Mexico is unconstitutional.
VII. POSSIBLE SOLUTION: SIMULTANEOUS CAPITAL JURIES
A. Introductionand Proposal
The discussion supra demonstrates the failure of a bifurcated capital trial with
a single jury in assuring the defendant a fair, impartial jury during the guilt/
innocence phase. There is a workable solution that will remedy this deficiency: the
impaneling of two juries during the guilt/innocence phase.
Logistically, the court would empanel the firstjury (Verdict Jury) through typical
voir dire. The Verdict Jury would be responsible for the guilt/innocence phase of
the trial. The second jury (Sentencing Jury) would go through the death-qualification impaneling process as set forth in the New Mexico Uniform Jury Instructions.255 If the Verdict Jury returns a verdict of not guilty, then the Sentencing Jury
would be dismissed as no longer necessary. If the Verdict Jury returns a guilty
verdict, the death-qualified Sentencing Jury would decide the sentence.
The use of two simultaneous juries would remedy some of the problems
associated with a single death-qualified jury in capital trials. Those jurors who may
oppose the death penalty, known as Witherspoon-excludables,will remain to decide
upon the defendant's guilt or innocence. The jury will not suffer from the
constitutional deficiencies as demonstrated by the sociological studies.256 This way,
a capital defendant is assured the same constitutional protections a non-capital
defendant is afforded.257
The state's interest in having a death-qualified jury decide upon the sentence is
preserved under the proposed solution. The Sentencing Jury, having been deathqualified, will decide upon the sentence of a convicted defendant. Additionally, the
Sentencing Jury will have heard evidence during the guilt/innocence phase relevant
to the sentencing decision. There will be no need to present the guilt/innocence
phase evidence twice. And indeed, the court may exclude the Sentencing Jury at any
point during the initial phase if evidence irrelevant to the sentencing determination
is presented.
The practice of selecting simultaneous juries is best known in the context of
issues involving co-defendants when certain evidence is admissible against only one
or some of the defendants and not against others, known as a Bruton problem.258 In
254. See Astorga v. New Mexico (S. Ct. No. 31,046). On interlocutory appeal from the district court, Astorga
argues, interalia,"The Captial Jury Project and other independent studies demonstrate that capitaljuries are biased
and predisposed against the defendant, which deprives the defendant of a fair trial, fair sentencing, and due process
of law." Appellant's Brief in Chief, Astorga v. New Mexico (S. Ct. No. 31,046) at i.
255. See UJI 14-121 NMRA. Note that the language would have to be changed to reflect the two jury system.
256. See Part ILC. 1 supra; see also Part V supra.
257. A non-capital defendant is not burdened with a death-qualified juror and is therefore afforded ajury that
has not been tilted towards guilt.
258. See, e.g., Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968). A Bruton dilemma arises when co-defendants are tried
jointly, an inculpating statement is given by one defendant about both defendants prior to trial, and the statement
is inadmissible as to the non-declarant defendant. Id.
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such circumstances, the trial courts usually grant motions to sever the trials, but an
alternative practice is to select dual juries.2 59 In general, each panel in a dual-jury
trial is present only for evidence relevant and admissible to that jury's eventual
decision. When the bulk of evidence presented in a trial is relevant for two juries
making two separate determinations, it becomes more efficient to have a dual-jury
procedure.
26°
The New Mexico Court of Appeals reviewed such a process in State v. Padilla.
Padilla presented the district court with a Bruton problem. 26' Given the district
court's discretion under Rule 5-203(C) NMRA 62 and Padilla's request to sever the
proceedings, the district court ordered the selection of dual juries.263 While Padilla
did not concern death-qualification, the court discussed the implementation of a
two-jury trial. For example, there was "no confusion or impropriety" with dual
juries. 2' The jury was instructed on the procedure and was told not to speculate as
to why there were two juries.265 Thus, a dual-jury procedure, admittedly for a
different purpose, has been approved for use in the New Mexico district courts. In
Padilla,of course, there were no questions of legislative intent or constraining rules
of criminal procedure with which the court had to grapple.
B. Considerations
The most apparent complication with the use of a dual jury system for a single
capital case involves the extra resources necessary for its implementation. 26 6 First,
the voir dire process would require an additional number of potential jurors. In
addition to the number of jurors necessary for a death-qualified jury (Sentencing
Jury), the court would need additional jurors for the Verdict Jury. However, it does
not appear that the solution would require twice as many potential jurors as under
existing capital trials. Rather, the Verdict Jury does not need to go through the
demanding process of death-qualification, which dismisses more jurors due to the
constitutional requirements discussed above. There would not be a need for two

259. Two juries were used in the infamous trial of Lyle and Erik Menendez precisely because of a Bruton
problem. Alan Abrahamson, Menendez Brothers'MurderTrial Opens,Los ANGELES TIMES, June 15, 1993, at B 3;
see also, Hedlund v. Sheldon, 840 P.2d 1008 (Ariz. 1992) (approving use of two juries); State v. Beam, 710 P.2d
526 (Idaho 1985) (same); People v. Patterson, 610 N.E.2d 16 (I. 1992) (same); Scarborough v. State, 437 A.2d
672 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (same); People v. Hana, 524 N.W.2d 682, (Mich. 1994) (same); Ewish v. State,
871 P.2d 306 (Nev. 1994) (same).
260. 1998-NMCA-088, 964 P.2d 829.
261. Id. (197-10, 964 P.2d at 831-32 (Padilla's co-defendant made statements inculpating to both himself
and Padilla. After the co-defendant asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the statements
became admissible only against the co-defendant and not Padilla.).
262. Rule 5-203(C) NMRA provides the district court with instructions on joining or severing criminal cases.
263. Padilla, 1998-NMCA-088,1 16, 964 P.2d at 833.
264. Id.
265. Id. (jurors explicitly told not to discuss the trial with members from the other jury).
266. New Mexico opponents to capital punishment cite to the enormous costs associated with implementation
of the penalty. New Mexico spends approximately four million dollars on the death penalty each year and currently
has two inmates on death row. See Joline Gutierrez Krueger, New Mexico Courts Taking Death Penalty into Their
Own Hands,ALBUQUERQUE TRIBUNE, Jan. 8,2008, availableat http://www.abqtrib.comlnews/20O8/jan08/newmexico-courts-taking-death-penalty-their-own-h. While there are additional costs associated with impaneling a
second jury, they likely pale in comparison to the total amount spent during a capital trial. And indeed, before the
state executes a defendant, spending additional resources to ensure a fair trial will increase the legitimacy of the
system.
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deliberation rooms, as both juries would never deliberate simultaneously. 267 Of
course, there would need to be two different rooms for the juries to go during break
and recess periods.
Still, there are other considerations. Namely, the additional jury would require
another seating arrangement. Indeed, the two juries would require separation and
strict supervision. This is not beyond the ability of courts, however. The court can
allot space in the galley for the second jury or provide temporary seating elsewhere.
The practical considerations of managing two juries in a single trial are possible, if
carefully controlled and planned.2 68
However, the policy of having the original jury that determines guilt or innocence
also determine the sentence is persuasive. It is a practice that is engrained in the
American capital punishment system of law. In addition, a dual-jury system could
cripple the basic tactic of residual doubt used in capital defense. 269 However, using
the same jury for both phases in a bifurcated capital trial requires that the jury
decides on the sentence only after consideration of aggravating factors and
mitigating circumstances. But, as discussed above, substantial evidence exists that
juries decide punishment prematurely and without such careful consideration. 27 ° So,
to the extent that the proposed Sentencing Jury prematurely decides on punishment,
it does not affect the improvement in the guilt/innocence phase. As for the noble
idea that, "jurors... cannot evade the heavy responsibility placed upon them of
' the CJP
whether a convicted person should receive the death penalty,"271
suggests
that jurors fail to accept responsibility for deciding upon the sentence anyway.272
So, if the original jurors decide prematurely and do not ultimately take
responsibility for their decision, they are not fulfilling their prescribed role.
There is little reason to maintain a dysfunctional system of single-jury bifurcated
capital trials.
C. Implementation
The Court in Fry rejected a similar proposal, in part, because of the idea that a
jury that decides guilt/innocence, should also decide upon the punishment. Indeed,
Fry's reasoning includes discussion on the intent of the legislature to have the
original jury decide sentencing. Thus, legislative action would probably be
267. During the guilt/innocence phase, only the Verdict Jury needs to deliberate.
268. State v. Lambright. 673 P.2d I (Ariz. 1983), rev'd, Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir.

2000). In discussing the logistical accomplishments of a dual jury trial, "[t]he two juries were kept physically
separated, and were carefully instructed not to speak with persons on the other jury....
[When both] juries were
present, one sat in the jury box and the other sat in designated rows of chairs on the other side of the courtroom."
Id.
269. Residual doubt may exist in a jury that nevertheless voted to convict, but may be hesitant to sentence

the defendant to death. Thus, a unitary capital jury may decide upon a guilty verdict, but fail to impose death during
the sentencing phase. Of course, under the proposed solution, a defendant would be unable to have residual doubt
within the Verdict Jury, which does not decide upon sentence. If the defendant's strategy relies upon residual doubt,
he could waive the dual-jury system and request a single jury.
270. See Part lI.C.
1 supra; see also Part V supra.
271. State v. Fry, 2006-NMSC-001,1 13,126 P.3d516, 524 (citing Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 247

(8th Cir. 1985) (Gibson, J., dissenting)).
272. Bowers, supra note 227, at 74-75 (49.2 percent of jurors in the CJP considered the defendant as the
party responsible for the sentence, while only 5.6 percent of thejurors identified themselves as the most responsible
party for the ultimate sentencing decision.).

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

(Vol. 38

necessary before this recommended change can be adopted as part of New Mexico's
capital jury selection process.273 Amended Uniform Jury Instructions would then
follow.274 Of course, the New Mexico Supreme Court could reconsider275 deathqualification in light of the CJP, and determine the process unconstitutional.27 6
VIII. CONCLUSION
There are serious systemic flaws in the implementation of capital punishment.
This note has discussed the prejudicial effect of death-qualification. Without a
change, accused defendants will continue to be subjected to partial and unfairjuries.
By impaneling two separate juries, New Mexico can begin to address some of the
inherent defects in capital punishment. New Mexico need not strictly adhere to
federal court precedent on the issue. Indeed, New Mexico should take the lead and
ensure fair and impartial capital trials. Implementing true bifurcation is but one
small step towards that goal.

273. See Appendix. The Capital Felony Sentencing Statute would require amendments. Some amendments
would include the insertion of a new section.
274. Modified Uniform Jury Instructions include instructions to both the verdict and sentencing juries. The
Verdict Jury would be instructed to decide upon the question of guilt/innocence without consideration of a possible
sentence. The Verdict Jury should be told the purpose of the Sentencing Jury. Voir dire for these jurors should be
limited to identifying and excluding "nullifiers" (those jurors whose opposition to the death penalty would affect
their guilt/innocence determination). See supranotes 106-107 and accompanying text. The Sentencing Jury should
be impaneled prior to the verdict phase. These jurors should be told their role in the process and not to consider
punishment until the Verdict Jury returns a guilty verdict.
275. Or, the New Mexico Supreme Court couldffully consider the McCree studies that have not undergone
examination. See supra notes 85-170 and accompanying text.
276. It is well within the ability of the New Mexico Supreme Court to declare the Capital Felony Sentencing
Act unconstitutional as the court is free to provide more protection to defendants under the State constitution than
the United States Supreme Court has provided under the federal constitution. See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M.
431, 863 P.2d 1052 (1993).
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APPENDIX
The following section would need insertion:
§ 31-20A-1A. Capital felony trials; procedure for verdict and sentencing
juries:
A. The court shall impanel two separate juries for capital felony trials,
except as provided under § 31-20A-1A(D). Both the verdict and sentencing
juries shall be present during the verdict phase of the bifurcated capital
felony trial. If there are proceedings during the verdict phase that do not
bear upon the sentencing decision of the sentencing jury, or if there is good
cause to exclude the sentencing jury during the verdict phase, the
sentencing jury shall be excused.
B. The verdict jury shall decide upon the verdict of the defendant without
consideration of the punishment.
C. If the verdict jury returns a verdict that the defendant is guilty of a
capital felony, or upon a plea of guilty to a capital felony, the sentencing
jury shall decide upon the proper sentence in accordance with § 31-20A-1.
D. A defendant charged with a capital felony may waive his right to a two
jury capital trial.
In addition, the following sections would require amendments:
§ 31-20A-1. Capital felony; sentencing procedure: A. At the conclusion of all
capital felony cases heard by the verdict jury, and after proper charge from the
court and argument of counsel, the verdict jury shall retire to consider a verdict
of guilty or not guilty without any consideration of punishment...
B. Upon a verdict by the verdict jury or judge that the defendant is guilty of a
capital felony, or upon a plea of guilty to a capital felony, the court shall conduct
a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be
sentenced to death or life imprisonment as authorized herein. In a jury trial, the
sentencing proceeding shall be conducted as soon as practicable by the original
trial judge before the sentencing jury. In a nonjury trial the sentencing
proceeding shall be conducted as soon as practicable by the original trial judge.
In the case of a plea of guilty to a capital felony, the sentencing proceeding shall
be conducted as soon as practicable by the original trial judge or by a sentencing
jury upon demand of a party.
§ 31-20A-2. Determination of sentence:
B. After weighing the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating
circumstances, weighing them against each other, and considering both the
defendant and the crime, the sentencing jury or judge shall determine whether
the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.
§ 31-20A-2.1. Prohibition against capital punishment of mentally retarded
persons; presentencing hearing:
C. Upon motion of the defense requesting a ruling that the penalty of death be
precluded under this section, the court shall hold a hearing, prior to conducting
the sentencing proceeding under Section 31-20A-3 NMSA 1978. If the court
finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant is mentally
retarded, it shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment. A ruling by the
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court that evidence of diminished intelligence introduced by the defendant does
not preclude the death penalty under this section shall not restrict the defendant's
opportunity to introduce such evidence at the sentencing proceeding or to argue
that that evidence should be given mitigating significance. If the sentencing
proceeding is conducted before a the sentencing jury, the sentencing jury shall
not be informed of any ruling denying a defendant's motion under this section.
§ 31-20A-3. Court sentencing:
In ajury sentencing proceeding in which the sentencingjury unanimously finds
beyond a reasonable doubt and specifies at least one of the aggravating
circumstances enumerated in Section 6 of this act, and unanimously specifies the
sentence of death pursuant to Section 3 of this act, the court shall sentence the
defendant to death. Where a sentence of death is not unanimously specified, or
the sentencing jury does not make the required finding, or the sentencing jury
is unable to reach a unanimous verdict, the court shall sentence the defendant to
life imprisonment. In a nonjury sentencing proceeding and in cases involving a
plea of guilty, where no sentencing jury has been demanded, the judge shall
determine and impose the sentence, but he shall not impose the sentence of death
except upon a finding beyond a reasonable doubt and specification of at least
one of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Section 6 of this act.
§ 31-20A-4. Review of judgment and sentence:
E. In cases of remand for a new sentencing proceeding, all exhibits and a
transcript of all testimony and other evidence admitted in the prior trial and
sentencing proceeding shall be admissible in the new sentencing proceeding,
and:
(1) if the sentencing proceeding was before a sentencing jury, a new sentencing
jury shall be impaneled for the new sentencing proceeding;
§ 31-20A-5. Aggravating circumstances:
The aggravating circumstances to be considered by the sentencing court or
sentencing jury pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-20A-2 NMSA 1978 are
limited to the following...
§ 31-20A-6. Mitigating circumstances:
The mitigating circumstances to be considered by the sentencing court or the
sentencing jury pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 of this act shall include
but not be limited to the following...
§ 31-18-14.1. Capital felony case heard by ejewy twojuries; sentencing hearing;
explanation by court to the juff juries:
At the beginning of a sentencing hearing for a capital felony case, subsequent to
a verdict by the verdict jury that the defendant is guilty of a capital felony, the
court shall explain to the sentencing jury that a sentence of life imprisonment
means that the defendant shall serve thirty years of his sentence before he
becomes eligible for a parole hearing, as provided in Section 31-21-10 NMSA
1978.

